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TAKING ACTION AGAINST AUCTIONS: THE THIRD 
CIRCUIT TASK FORCE REPORT 
Jill E. Fisch* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Third Circuit has assumed a position of leadership in analyzing class 
action litigation.1 Its reports, decisions and approaches have been intluentiaJ.2 
Most recently, the Third Circuit created the Third Circuit Task Force on the 
Selection of Class Counsel ("Task Force") to respond to new developments in 
the procedures for selecting and compensating lead counsel, including the lead 
counsel auction and the lead plaintiff provision of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").3 The product of this Task Force, the Third 
Circuit Task Force Report on Selection of Counsel ("Report"),4 continues the 
tradition, and we can expect it to enjoy similar influence. 
The Report is a thoughtful carefully researched attempt to evaluate recent 
developments in the selection and compensation of class counsel and to provide 
guidelines for future decision making. Its primary focus is the two developments 
that motivated its preparation-the lead counsel auction and the lead plaintiff 
• Professor, Fordham Law School. This review was written while the author was serving as 
Sloan Visiting Professor at Georgetown University Law Center. 
1. For example, the court's decisions in Lindy Bros. Builders v. Am. Radiator & Standard 
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Lindy !")and Lindy Bros. Builders v. Am. Radiator & 
Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) ("Lindy !I") established a widely imitated 
prototype for application of the lodestar method of calculating attorneys fees. In 1985. the court 
formed a Task Force to consider the problems presented by the Lindy doctrine and to "begin(] the 
process of seeking solutions for the deficiencies in current practice." Third Circuit Task Force, Court 
Awarded Attorneys Fees, reprinted in 108 F.R.D. 237, 274 (1985). The Task Force produced a highly 
regarded report on court awarded attorneys fees in class litigation. Recently, the court issued the first 
circuit court opinion to evaluate the lead counsel auction. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 
270-71 (3d Cir. 2001). 
2. See. e.g., Alan J. Tomkins & Thomas E. Willging, TAXATION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES: 
PRACTICES IN ENGLISH, ALASKAN, AND FEDERAL COURTS 50-51 (1986) (describing Lindy I as 
providing one of "two most influential fee calculation methodologies that emerged" during first 
decade in which fee jurisprudence was developing); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council 
for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 563 (1986) (citing lodestar approach, as developed through Lindy I and 
Lindy II. with approval); George B. Murr, Analysis of !he Valualion of Attorney Work Product 
According to !he Markel for Claims: Reformula!ing 1he Lodes1ar Me1hod, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 599, 
614-18 (2000) (describing impact of 1985 Report on subsequent fee determinations). 
3. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
4. Third Circuit Task Force, Report on Selection of Class Counsel ("Report"), available al 
http://www .ca3. uscourts.gov /classcounsel/final %20re port %20of% 20thi rd% circuit% 20tas k% 20force. p 
df. reprinled in 74 TEMP. L. REV. 685 (2002). Subsequent references will use the pagination of the 
electronic version of the Report. 
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provision of the PSLRA.5 Its target audience is the bench and bar. In particular. 
the Report is designed to '·assist[J courts, especially new judges. in determining 
how to proceed with appointment and compensation of counsel in class 
actions."6 
The Report's conclusions are straightforward. With respect to auctions. the 
Report warns that their shortcomings are likely to outweigh their benefits.7 
Similarly. although generally supportive of the empowered lead plaintiff 
approach. the Report concludes that it too is untested and, accordingly, "declines 
to recommend that the PSLRA model be extended to the appointment of 
counsel in other kinds of class actions, such as antitrust cases."s The Report 
concludes that courts should continue to employ traditional methods of selecting 
and compensating class counsel, "with significant reliance on private orclering."9 
Lead counsel auctions have enjoyed a fair amount of attention since the 
highly publicized auctions in Cendant10 and Auction Houses,11 but there has been 
relatively little careful analysis of the auction methodology.12 The Report makes 
a valuable contribution by conducting a thorough analysis and by reaching 
conclusions that are sound, clear and supported by the evidence. Drawing on an 
empirical analysis of auction cases,13 the Report identifies a variety of problems 
with the auction methodology, many of which are incompletely considered in 
existing auction decisions. Although the Report is unlikely to dissuade auction 
supporters, it should serve as a fair warning to others that auctions may not 
deliver on their promises. Moreover, many of the principles addressed in the 
Report can be extended beyond the auction context. 
At 112 pages, 14 the Report demonstrates impressive depth. At the same 
time, it leaves many questions unaddressed. The Report leaves for another clay 
difficult normative assessments about the effectiveness of existing litigation 
levels and the extent to which judges' opinions about the social value of litigation 
should inform their fee determinations. The Report also emphasizes securities 
and antitrust cases-areas in which there has already been extensive 
experimentation. Neither the lead counsel auction nor the empowered lead 
plaintiff model are well suited to mass torts or consumer fraud cases,15 yet the 
5. See id. at 6 (observing that development of lead counsel auctions and empowered lead plaintiff 
model ·'gave rise to the appointment of this Task Force.") 
6. !d. at 12. 
7. !d. at 49. 
8. !d. at 94. 
9. !d. at 18. 
lO. In re Cendam Corp. Lilig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001). 
II. In re AuCiion Houses Antitrusc Licig., 197 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
12. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the SeleCiion of Class 
Counsel by AtiCiion. 102 COLUM. L. REv. 650 (2002) (identifying limited scrutiny of auction approach 
and offering comprehensive analysis of auction methodology). 
13. Laura! L. Hooper and Marie Leary, Auctioning the Role of Class Coumel in Class ACiion 
Cases: A Descriptive Study (Federal Judicial Center 2001) (FJC Report). 
14. See Report. supra note 4. 
15. See Fisch. mpra note 12. at 725-27. 
l 
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limitations of private ordering in these areas suggest a need for continued 
innovation. 
I. THE AUCTION ANAL YS!S 
The Report devotes the majority of its attention to the lead counsel auction. 
Reviewing the arguments concerning the auction procedure, the Report 
concludes that the dominant justification offered in favor of auctions is lower fee 
awards.16 The Report rejects this justification, finding both that the asserted 
benefit is "speculative" and that it is outweighed by the costs and risks of the 
auction procedure.17 
The Report demonstrates that, as is true with many reform proposals, there 
are substantial gaps between theory and practice. The auction theory literature 
makes a variety of claims about efficiency and price production based on 
assumptions about the auction context.18 In the case of lead counsel auctions, 
assumptions about full information20 and adequate competition21 are generally 
inappropriate. Even in situations in which these assumptions are accurate, 
auction results may deviate substantially from theoretical predictions.l9 As a 
result, lead counsel auctions are unlikely to minimize legal fees.22 
Significantly, auctions cannot be defended by comparing the fee awards in 
recent auction cases to the benchmarks that are commonly used in class action 
litigation. Although a fee award of thirty-three percent or twenty-five percent is 
appropriate in some cases, benchmarks are often used as a substitute for a 
careful fee assessment. Ironically, the source of these benchmarks is the 
16. Report, supra note 4, at 45 ("The major contention of auction proponents is that auctions 
replicate the market and result in savings to the class due to lower counsel fees"). 
17. !d. at 49. 
18. See Fisch, supra note 12. at 695-98 (describing auction theory literature). 
19. Bid preparation requires the bidding firm to predict the expected recovery and the litigation 
effort that will be required to obtain that recovery. Both predictions involve a range of variables that 
are subject to considerable uncertainty. Among the issues that the firm must consider are the risk that 
it will be unable to establish liability, the difficulty calculating damages. and the potential that the 
defendant's financial resources will be insufficient to satisfy a judgment. See, e.g., Brenda Sandburg, 
CEO Cleared in Rare Stock Drop Trial, THE RECORDER. Feb. 13, 2002 (observing that defense jury 
verdict in Howard v. Everex Systems Inc .. 92-3742 was likely to affect how plaintiffs' lawyers value 
future cases). 
20. To date. kad counsel auctions have been conducted in only a handful of cases, but many of 
those cases have involved a small number of few bids. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, AuCLions, 
and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 53. 90 (Spring/Summer 2001) (describing bidder participation): FJC Report, supra note 13 at 
14-19 (detailing numbers of submitted bids in various auction cases). 
21. See, e.g., Tilman Borgers and Christian Dustmann, S1range Bids: Bidding Behavior in the 
United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction, at 7-8 (working paper 2001) (demonstrating 
"large and systematic" deviations from theoretical predictions for bids in UK spectrum license 
auctions and consequently questioning whether auction results were efficient). 
22. The Report goes on to reject the argument that fee minimization demonstrates the success of 
an auction. See Report. s11pra note 4. at 45. Indeed, the Report identifies a variety of negative 
consequences to the auction procedure. !d. In particular, the Report warns that auctions can sacrifice 
total recovery in favor of a lower fee award. !d. 
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marketplace to which auction proponents profess fidelity.23 The standard 
perce ntage fee in traditional contingency fee agreements is one thircl.24 Taking 
decisions like Synrhroid at their word, contingency agreements in comparable 
individual lawsuits are an appropriate source of information on market rates.25 
At the same time, it is unreasonable to defend auction results by comparing 
thelll to statistical averages. Existing auction experience does not involve the 
"typical" class action. Instead, auctions have been used in strong well-publicized 
cases with substantial damages. Indeed, judges report that the cases most 
suitable for an auction are those in which liability is clear, information about the 
case is available in the public domain or from a criminal investigation, and 
damages are substantial, offering the potential for a very large recovery.26 Cases 
with those characteristics appear unlikely to warrant a benchmark fee award of 
one third irrespective of the fee methodology employed by the court. 
Moreover, courts already have the tools to avoid the wooden application of 
a fixed benchmark. It is unnecessary to resort to an auction to reduce fees in 
percentage terms. Decisions such as Goldberger v. integrated Resources, Inc. ,27 
in re Prudential Insurance Co. of America Sales Practices Litigation,28 and In re 
NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation,29 demonstrate the ability of 
courts to scrutinize fee applications and award fees far below the traditional 
benchmark without conducting an auction. 
To the extent that judges rely on traditional benchmarks because they are 
reluctant to conduct a more rigorous inquiry, the auction offers little hope of 
improvement. The challenges of designing and implementing an appropriate 
auction procedure limit the ease with which an auction can be deployed.30 
Auctions are unlikely to generate competitive bids in precisely those cases in 
which the fee determination process is most difficult, such as cases in which the 
potential recovery is limited or where there is a substantial risk of nonrecovery. 
Many such cases attract only a single firm and, under the current system, are 
resolved by settlements and fee awards that receive little oversight or review. 
23. See FJC Report, supra note 13. at 16 (finding that "the most common reason judges gave for 
employing bidding was to foster competition among counsel by replicating the private marketplace for 
legal services"). 
24. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Relurns of Comingency Fee Legal Praclice, 
47 DEPAUL L REV. 267, 285-86 (1998) (explaining "[o)ne-third is the 'standard' contingency fee 
figure'' and reporting survey results showing ninety-two percent of lawyers employing a flat 
percentage used a rate of thirty-three percent). 
25. See In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712. 719 (7th Cir. 2001) (instructing courts to look 
to prevailing market rates in determining fee award and citing fee agreements signed by individual 
class m embers as one guide to such rates). 
26. FJC Report, supra note 13, at SO. 
27. 209 F.3d 43,44-45 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding fee award of four percent of recovery). 
-8. 106 F. Supp. 2d 721, 735-36 (D. N.J. 2000) (awarding fee of 4.8 percent of recovery in case 
involring ·•extraordinary risk"). 
�9. 187 F.R.D. 465,470 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (awarding fee of fourteen percent of recovery). 
30. See Paul Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design 17 (Working Paper. June 21. 
2000). available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=237114 (explaining importance 
of auction design and risks of using inappropriately designed auction). 
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The Report correctly recognizes that these cases are unsuitable for an auction.31 
Even the use of a carefully designed auction provides no assurance that the 
resulting fee is reasonable. The results of auction cases such as Cendant and 
Aucrion Houses suggest reason to question auction results.32 Cendant was a 
··simple case in terms of liability ... and the case was settled at a very early stage, 
after little formal discovery."33 Nonetheless. the auction produced a fee of 
approximately $ 10.861 per hour3� or a lodestar multiplier of 45.75.35 In Auction 
Houses. plaintiffs were able to benefit from a concurrent aovernment b 
investigation,36 and the defendants were known to possess considerable financial 
resources. In addition, the Auction Houses bidders had access to an unusual 
amount of information about the case: interim lead counsel had hired experts to 
prepare studies of potential damages, which were distributed to all the bidding 
firms37 StilL the auction produced a fee of $26.75 million for less than six 
months' work. Perhaps more troubling was that the second highest bid, which 
would have won the auction if the Boies firm had not participated, would have 
resulted in a total fee of $77 million.38 
II. THE BIGGER PICTURE 
The Report's detailed review of the auction process is a valuable service. 
More important, however, the Report recognizes that, by using an auction, 
courts may sacrifice class recovery in favor of minimizing legal fees.39 In class 
litigation, results count. Any procedural tool or reform proposal must be 
evaluated in terms of its ability to further the objectives of the litigation. In 
representative litigation, in particular, judges must keep their eyes on the ball. 
The relationship between counsel fees and litigation objectives has received 
insufficient attention. Although traditional fee analysis purports to consider the 
benefit provided to the plaintiff class,40 existing methodologies offer courts little 
31. Report, supra note 4, at 70-72. 
32. See Fisch, supra note 21. at 84-88 (evaluating results in several auction cases). 
33. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201. 285 (3d Cir. 2001). 
34. Memorandum of Law by Corporation Counsel of the City of New York in Opposition to the 
Application of Lead Counsel for Attorneys· Fees at 1. 9. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 191 F.R.D. 387 
(D. N.J. 1998) (No. 98-CY-1664). 
35. In re Cendan1. 264 F.3d at 285. 
36. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Lirig . . 197 F.R.D. 71, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
37. !d. 
38. See Fisch, supra note 12. at 684. 
39. Report. supra note 4. at 45. From the perspective of plaintiff class, a total recovery of $1 
million of which counsel receives a fifty percent fee is more attractive than a total recovery of 
$250,000. of which counsel receives ten percent. As in traditional litigation. the potential for the 
interests of lawyer and client to diverge increases as counsel's percentage interest in the lawsuit 
decreases. Fee structures in which counsel receives a very low fee in percentage terms-particularly 
when that percentage is set ex ante-can create substantial agency problems. See Fisch, supra note 12. 
at 678-79. 
40. Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to A ddress the Rulemaking 
Challenges. 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74. 162 (1 996) (studying fee awards and identifying as indicators that 
the court considered class benefit "(I) use of percentage-of-recovery method, (2) any adjustments to 
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guidance as to how to incorporate an assessment of litigation value into their 
analysis. 
Class actions serve a variety of objectives, including identification of 
wrongdoing. victim compensation and deterrence of misconduct.�1 A court can 
compare the size of the recovery to the damages suffered by class victims to 
approximate the extent to which the recovery compensates class members. 
Similarly, although a court cannot predict the effect of a particular resolution on 
future wrongdoing. because wrongdoers are held accountable when they are 
required to pay in accordance with the damages that they intlict, recovery size 
can also be used as a proxy for deterrence effect.�2 
Assessing the full social value of class litigation is more difficult. First. the 
benefits provided by the litigation must be measured against the litigation costs. 
Second, the private costs and benefits of litigation may diverge from the social 
costs and benefits.43 This raises the question whether the judge. in monitoring 
representative litigation, should attempt merely to replicate the theoretical result 
of a traditional lawsuit or should consider broader societal interests. In 
particular, because the costs of litigation are frequently passed on in the market. 
it is not socially desirable to pursue every meritorious claim.44 Third. a 
resolution may favor one objective over another.45 How should a court choose 
between compensation and deterrence? Fourth, a court cannot assess the value 
of a particular case in isolation. The deterrence effect of a single judgment, for 
example, depends on how it affects the actual and perceived likelihood that 
future wrongdoers will be held accountable.46 
Finally, the court must consider the impact of its fee award on counsel's 
lodestar amount based on results achieved, and (3) whether court considered any fee objections"'). 
41. See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, A n  Enforcement Official's Reflections on A nritrust Class Acrions. 
39 ARIZ. L. REv. 413, 439-40 (1997) (identifying deterrence, compensation and identification of 
wrongdoing as social objectives of class action litigation). 
42. But see James D. Cox. Private Litigaiion and the Deterrence of Corporme Misconduct, 60 LAw 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Autumn 1997) (examining relationship between compensation and deterrt:!nce 
objectives of civil litigation and questioning whether compensation-based damages maximize 
deterrence). Moreover, from a deterrence perspective, damages need not be paid to the victims of 
misconduct. For deterrence purposes. the allocation of the recovery between class members. class 
counsel, and even the U.S. Treasury, is largely irrelevant. See Jill E. Fisch. Class A uion Reform. Qui 
Tam. and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167. 182-83 (Autumn 1997) (exploring 
alternative methods of calculating and awarding damages to further deterrence objective). 
43. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on the Divergence between the Private and rhe Social 
Motive to Settle under a Negligence Rule, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 613. 613-15 (1997) (describing possible 
divergence between private incentives and social value of litigation). 
44. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, Orders and Incentives as Regulatory 
lv!ethods: The Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1115. 1172 (1988) 
(explaining that litigation expenses of civil enforcement will be borne by customers). 
45. See Fisch. supra note 42, at 174-75 (demonstrating how increased focus on deterrence rather 
than compensation has led to structural changes in class litigation). 
46. A full analysis of deterrence theory is beyond the scope of this review. See generally John T. 
Scholz. Enforcement Policy and Corporate lv!isconduct: The Changing PerspeCiive of Deterrence 
Theory, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (Summer 1997) (describing simple model of deterrence 
theory and complications identified through recent empirical research). 
1 
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litigation incentives. As the Report recognizes, class litigation is lawyer driven.-17 
Litigation decisions in common fund cases are influenced by counsel's financial 
incentives. Cases will not be litigated unless they offer a sufficient reward for 
entrepreneurial lawyers to act as private attorneys generaJ.-ll.' 
Should a court consider social as well as private value in determining legal 
fees? To what extent should the court attempt to influence future litigation 
levels through the structure and size of its fee awards? The answers to these 
questions depend on normative judgments about the appropriate role of 
representative litigation and are clearly beyond the scope of the current Report. 
Nonetheless, beginning the inquiry would be a valuable endeavor. In particular. 
answers to these questions may resolve many of the current debates over 
process. For example, the argument that legal fees in class actions should be 
based on market rates presumes that fees should only reflect the value provided 
to the plaintiff class. Similarly, the auction procedure cannot be used to capture 
the social value of litigation. In comparison, the most compelling defense for ex 
post fee determinations is that they empower the judge to reflect both the public 
and the private benefits provided by the litigation in the fee award. 
The extent to which the class action mechanism should be structured to 
increase deterrence is politically controversial.49 Similarly, the appropriate 
balance between government and private enforcement is unclear.50 In addition. 
a variety of factors affect the effectiveness of civil litigation in addressing 
wrongdoing. Nonetheless, legal reforms that reduce the viability of the class 
action create a legal climate that contributes to corporate misconduct. Some 
commentators, for example, have asserted that such reforms made the 
wrongdoing at Enron possible.51 Certainly the Enron experience demonstrates 
the inability of government regulation and criminal law to prevent the 
widespread dislocations caused by corporate misconduct. In a post-Enron world, 
the continued availability of the class action mechanism as a tool for victim 
47. Report. supra note 4. at 3. 
48. See Fisch, supra note 42, at 173-75 (describing financial incentives for class counsel to act as 
private attorneys general). 
4\1. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Markers as lvfonirors: A Proposal to Replace Class Acriom with 
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers. 85 VA. L. REV. 925 . 929-30 (1999) (arguing that deterrence 
rather than compensation should be primary goal in securities fraud litigation). 
50. See Fisch, supra note 42. at 198-201 (proposing extension of qui tam model to permit 
coordination between government and private enforcement efforts). 
51. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton. Now Who, Exacrly, Col Us inro This?, N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 3. 2002. § 
3. at l. col. 5 (quoting Barbara Roper, director of investor protection at the Consumer Federation of 
America. arguing that Congress. by adopting the PSLRA, helped create environment that led to 
Enron-Anderson scandal.) The PSLRA enacted a variety of curbs on private civil litigation including 
a limitation on the liability exposure of auditors. a heightened pleading requirement. and a discovery 
stay during the pendency of a motion to dismiss. See Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act 
of 1995. 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 717,725-31 (1996). Ironically, the PSLRA also enacted the statutory lead 
plaintiff provision. !d. at 726. Although the Report questions the feasibility of the empowered lead 
plaintiff model, I have argued elsewhere that the model offers substantial promise for addressing many 
issues in the selection and compensation of class counsel. See Fisch. supra note 12, at 710-14 
(describing the advantages of the empowered lead plaintiff model). 
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compensation and deterrence of wrongdoing has become increasingly important. 
If civil litigation is to serve broader social goals. these considerations must 
be reflected in class action fee awards. Repeated downward pressure on counsel 
fees weakens the driving force behind entrepreneurial litigation. Consequently, 
the impact of fee minimization can extend beyond any particular case. If fee 
awards are systematically too low, they will provide plaintiffs lawyers with 
insufficient incentives to litigate, resulting in suboptimal litigation levels. In the 
short run. lawyers will file fewer cases. In the long run, legal talent will be driven 
away from the plaintiffs bar to areas of greater financial reward. From a societal 
perspective. the resulting costs will be inadequate compensation and excessive 
levels of misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
In its recent Report, the Third Circuit Task Force acknowledges the 
important role of the class action in identifying and rectifying public harms. The 
Report recognizes that well-intentioned reform efforts may interfere with the 
ability of class actions to perform that role. Although it may appear unduly 
conservative to demand that proponents of regulatory reform clearly 
demonstrate the efficacy of their proposals, the Report fairly judges that, with 
respect to lead counsel auctions, the supporters have not made their case. 
